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Dispute Resolution Under MERCOSUR
from 1991 to 1996:




In December 1994, meeting at the Summit of the Americas in Miami, the leaders of
the thirty-four American democracies unanimously dedared a commitment to complete a
hemispheric free trade pact by 2005.3 As they envisioned, this pact would produce a Free
Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA') stretching from Alaska to Argentina and encompass-
ing over 800 million consumers. 4 Although by present appearances a fully negotiated
FTAA may come to fruition later (by say 2010) rather than sooner (by 2005), a Western
Hemispheric trading bloc nonetheless seems inevitable.5
1. I wish to thank Thomas O'Keefe, President, Mercosur Consulting Group; Professor Adriana
Dreyzin de Klor, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, Universidad Nacional de C6rdoba, C6rdoba,
Argentina; Dr. Alejandro Ponieman, Director, Asociaci6n Interamericano de Mediaci6n, Buenos
Aires, Argentina; and two political scientists, Professor John Bailey of Georgetown University and
Professor Larry Hufford of St. Mary's University, for their helpful insights. This work is dedicated
to my wife, Lilliana.
2. Associate Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. J.D., cum laude, Harvard Law
School, 1988; B.S.F.S., magna cum laude, Georgetown University, 1985.
3. See Americas Summit Leaders Back Historic Trade Declaration, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1915
(Dec. 14, 1994).
4. See U.S. Exports to Western Hemisphere Could Reach $200 Billion Next Year, 11 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1447 (Sept. 21, 1994). ("By the turn of the century, the hemisphere's population will
approach 820 million, and gross profit could exceed $12 trillion.").
5. A meeting of high level trade officials from the American democracies, held in Cartagena,
Columbia in March 1996, confirmed that such a pact will be reached but that 2005 appears to be
an unduly optimistic deadline for completing negotiations. See Americas Trade Meeting Makes
Little Progress, 4 LATIN AMER. L. & Bus. REP. Apr. 30, 1996, at 38.
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The projected delay in finalizing the FTAA partially is attributable to disagreement
among the American democracies over what is the best path toward an FTAA.6 The
United States, for example, has favored expansion of the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA") 7 on a country-by-country basis, beginning with Chile.8
Unfortunately, Congress' refusal in 1995 and 1996 to grant fast-track authority to the
Clinton Administration to negotiate Chile's accession to NAFTA reduced the
Administration's ability to influence the FTAA process.9 In contrast, Brazil, the undisput-
ed economic powerhouse of South America,10 prefers a very gradual approach based on
negotiations dominated by NAFTA and a Brazil-centered, yet-to-be-created South
American Free Trade Area ("SAFTA)." Brazil's position with respect to the FTAA process
6. See Challenge to Americas Trade Pact is to Define Approach, Official Says, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
893 (May 29, 1996). The routes to an FTAA most commonly discussed are hemispheric negotia-
tions wherein each country is represented individually, country-by-country accession to a pre-
existing trading group until such time as all American nations are included, and the formation of
several regional trading blocs that later are linked together via bloc-to-bloc negotiations. See
FTAA Working Groups Prepare for Vice-Ministerial in Bogota, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2011
(Dec. 6, 1995); Officials Expect FTAA Liberalization to be Less Than NAFTA, MERCOSUR Levels,
12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1641 (Oct. 4, 1995). These various paths are not entirely mutually
exclusive. It is possible that the path actually taken to an FTAA will involve some combination of
individual representation, accession, and bloc building.
7. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.- Mex. - U.S., 32 I.L.M. 296 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA].
8. See The Americas Drift Towards Free Trade, ECONOMIST, July 8, 1995, at 35. [hereinafter Americas
Drift].
9. See No Chile Fast-Track Authority in '96, White House Advisor Says, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 763
(May 8, 1996); Intra-American Trade: Brazil Gets Its Way, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1996, at 45 [here-
inafter Brazil Gets Its Way]. Fast-track authority permits the President "to submit legislation
implementing trade agreements to Congress for a straight up or down vote after formal intro-
duction. ' Key Staffer Sees Fast-Track Extension in 1997 Regardless of Who Wins Election, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 705 (May 1, 1996). Fast-track authority is crucial to NAFTA expansion
because countries interested in acceding to NAFTA, such as Chile, simply will not devote much
effort to negotiating with United States trade officials only to have such negotiations unraveled in
piecemeal fashion by Congress. See Americas Drift, supra note 8, at 35; Howard LaFranchi, Chile,
the Slender Success Story, Hopes to Fatten on U.S. Trade Ties, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 1, July 25,
1995, at 1, 7.
10. "Brazil is the largest nation in South America in terms of area, population and economy." Brazib
September 1996, National Westminster Bank Country Briefs, Sept. 1, 1996, at 1, available in
WESTLAW, Allnews Database, 1996 WL 9686009. "By itself, Brazil accounts for 75% of the total
MERCOSUR gross domestic product (GDP) and for 80% of its industrial manufactures." Luigi
Manzetti, The Political Economy of MERCOSUR, 35 J. INTERAMER. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 101, 123
(1993-94).
11. See Michael Reid, A Survey of MERCOSUR: And Now, the Hemisphere, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1996,
at 27, 28 ("Though Brazil's diplomats talk less loudly than they used to of building a South
American free-trade area that appears still to be the goal"); Reginald Dale, Latin America Forges
Ahead on Trade, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 16, 1996, at 11 ("Brazil prefers a slow move to hemi-
spheric free trade so that it can build a South American Free Trade Area around Mercosur as a
negotiating counterweight to NAFTA. In that way, Brazil hopes to be better able to resist the
American demands and NAFTA disciplines that it finds objectionable").
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is grounded on the political reality that negotiating free trade via a massive Brazil-centered
trading bloc rather than merely bilaterally with the United States will give Brazil far greater
leverage. 12
For the time being, Brazil is in the driver's seat in selecting the path to an integrated
trading bloc for the Western Hemisphere. Thus, even assuming Congress grants fast-track
authority for NAFTA expansion in 1997 or 1998 (as some in Washington expect' 3), it
appears probable that the Western Hemisphere will be integrated for trading purposes pri-
marily by linking a large northern trading bloc with a large southern trading bloc.14
Whatever form the southern bloc or SAFTA ultimately takes, it is sure to be grounded on
the Southern Cone Common Market ("MERCOSUR"). MERCOSUR is a nascent but
unexpectedly successful customs union between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
that unites over 200 million potential consumers with a combined gross domestic product
of nearly $1 trillion. 15 In 1996, MERCOSUR expanded by signing a free trade accord with
Chile and was poised to merge with the five members of the Andean Pact.16 It would be a
mistake for North Americans to underestimate the power of MERCOSUR ("said to be one
of the most dynamic trading blocs in the world" 17) to direct the FTAA process.18
As representatives of the American democracies begin crafting an FTAA, dispute reso-
lution will be central to the negotiations. The negotiators' ability to devise procedures that
12. See Michael Zamba, With U.S. Hare Flagging in Trade Race, Latin American Tortoise is Catching
Up, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 16, 1996, at 19. Americas Drift; supra note 8, at 35; Brazil Gets
Its Way, supra note 9, at 45. Brazil's position dearly makes political sense. In dealing with devel-
oping countries, the United States historically has preferred bilateral trade negotiations precisely
because its relative size and economic power enable it to extract greater concessions than other-
wise would be possible in a negotiation involving relative equals. See Raymond Vernon, The
World Trade Organization: A New Stage in International Trade and Development 36 HARv. INT'L
L.J. 329, 340 (1995).
13. See, e.g., House Staffer Now More Optimistic on Fast-Track Compromise in 1997, 13 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 763 (May 8, 1996).
14. See Humberto Marquez, Expansion of MERCOSUR Changes Negotiations for FTAA, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, July 12, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnews Database, 1996 WL 10768128; U.S.,
Canada Will Talk with MERCOSUR with or without Mexico, Official Says, 13 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1049 (June 26,1996).
15. See Why All the MERCOSUR Excitement?, 4 MARKET LATN AM., Sept. 1, 1996, at 1.
16. MERCOSUR was formed in March 1991. See Treaty Establishing a Common Market Between
the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the
Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 (1991)[hereinafter Treaty of
Asuncion]. The MERCOSUR-Chile free trade agreement officially entered into force on October
1, 1996. See Chile's MERCOSUR Membership Takes Effect, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1576 (Oct. 9,
1996). The Andean Pact nations -- Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela --
announced in September 1996 that they had agreed to negotiate a free trade acccord with MER-
COSUR. See Chile loins Southern Cone Common Market as Andean Nations Agree to Multilateral
Free-Trade Negotiations with MERCOSUR, NotiSur-Latin American Political Affairs, Oct. 4, 1996,
available in WESTLAW, Latnews Database, 1996 WL 8089443.
17. Gabriel Escobar, S. American Trade Bloc Expands and Prospers, Chile is Wekomed as Fifth Member,
WASH. POST, July 3, 1996, at A33.
18. See Robert S. Greenberger, Latin Nations, Unsure of US. Motives, Make Their Own Trade Pacts,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 1996, at A1 (explaining that it becomes harder for the United States to control
the direction of free trade discussions as MERCOSUR grows).
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will efficiently, effectively, and peacefully settle trade disputes between the member states
will be crucial to the FTAA's success. In attempting to formulate such procedures, the
negotiators will have several intriguing models from which to draw, including the dispute
resolution systems of the European Community,19 World Trade Organization, 20 and those
of NAFTA and MERCOSUR. 21 In a companion piece to this Article, I described the dis-
pute resolution experience under NAFTA during its first three years of existence. 22 The
purpose of this Article is to compare the institutions, dispute resolution processes, and
actual dispute resolution experience of MERCOSUR with those of NAFTA and to suggest
a number of important implications of the comparison for dispute resolution in any
future FTAA.
Part II of the Article opens by describing essential terms of the MERCOSUR agree-
ments, the evolving character of MERCOSUR's institutional structure, and the ways in which
that structure differs from NAFTAs institutional structure. Part III discusses the processes
available under MERCOSUR for settling trade disputes between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay,
and Uruguay and identifies distinctions between those processes and NAFTA's dispute reso-
lution systems. Part IV examines trade-related disputes that arose between the MERCOSUR
parties as of September 1996 and explains the reluctance of the parties to formally subject
such disputes to MERCOSUR's dispute resolution systems. Part IV also contrasts the MER-
COSUR dispute resolution experience with that under NAFTA. Finally, Part V posits several
key implications of the early dispute settlement experience under MERCOSUR for the pro-
posed FTAA. According to this analysis, the FTAA negotiators ought to construct a phased-
in dispute resolution system that initially relies nearly exclusively on high-level consultations
and then, after time, makes available the use of multinational institutions and formal adver-
sarial proceedings for the resolution of trade disputes.
19. The European Community is a formal customs union in which the fifteen member countries --
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom -- have ceded some national sov-
ereignty to supranational institutions, including the European Parliament, the European
Commission, the European Council, and, most importantly for dispute resolution purposes, the
European Court of Justice. See John P. Flaherty & Maureen E. Lally-Green, The European Union:
Where Is It Now?, 34 DuQ. L. REz'. 923,958-72 (1996).
20. Inaugurated on January 1, 1995, the WTO consists of over 120-member countries and is respon-
sible for implementing and enforcing numerous multilateral trade agreements including the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), the General Agreement on Trade in Services
("GATS"), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
("TRIPs"). See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1145; see generally Vemon, supra note 12.
21. Indeed, the American democracies already have begun the process of creating a multinational
working group charged with identifying the dispute resolution mechanisms of the numerous
trading arrangements extant in the Western Hemisphere. See FTAA Ministers Agree to Establish a
Dispute Settlement Working Group, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 510 (Mar. 27, 1996).
22. See David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early Experience, 32 TEX.
INr'L L. J. 163 (1997).
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II. The Purposes and Institutions of MERCOSUR.
MERCOSUR's objectives and organizational structure are governed by two agree-
ments: the Treaty of Asuncion and the Ouro Preto Protocol. The Treaty of Asuncion (for-
mally the "Treaty Establishing a Common Market Between the Argentine Republic, the
Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay, and the Eastern Republic of
Uruguay") was signed in March 1991 and entered into force in November 1991.23 The
Ouro Preto Protocol (formally the "Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the
Institutional Structure of MERCOSUR") was signed in December 1994 but did not for-
mally take effect until January 1996.24
A. MERCOSUR's EVOLUTION TOWARD A COMMON MARKET.
For ease of analysis, commentators categorize the various trading blocs in the world
according to each group's degree of economic integration. Ranging from lowest to highest
degree of integration these are free trade zones, customs unions, common markets, eco-
nomic unions, and federalized states having total economic integration.25 In a free trade
zone, the parties eliminate barriers to internal trade but retain separate tariff structures
vis-a-vis outsiders. 26 A customs union is a free trade zone but with a common external
tariff on goods imported from outsiders.27 A common market contains the elements of a
customs union plus the absence of restrictions on the internal movement of the factors of
production.28 An economic union "combines all the features of a common market and
adds harmonization of the different macroeconomic policies of all the different member
states."29 Finally, total economic integration is the equivalent of a federal state, having uni-
fied economic and social policies and centralized, supranational entities whose decisions
are binding on the participants. 30
The formal goal of MERCOSUR is to create a common market-31 This implies (1) the
"free movement of goods, services and factors of production between countries through,
inter alia, the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff restrictions on the movement
23. Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 16; JORGE PEREZ OTERMIN, EL MERCADO COMUN DEL SUR: DESDE
ASUNCION A OURO PRETO, ASPECTOS JURIDICOS-INSITUCIONALES 11 (1995).
24. Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure of MERCOSUR,
Dec. 17, 1994, art. 1, 34 I.L.M. 1244, 1258 [hereinafter Ouro Preto Protocol]. Article 48 of the
Ouro Preto Protocol provides that the accord shall not enter into force until "30 days after the
date of deposit of the third instrument of ratification' The third instrument of ratification was
deposited on December 15, 1995. Telephone Interview with Manual Olarreaga, Coordinator,
MERCOSUR Secretariat (Oct. 8, 1996).
25. See Thomas A. O'Keefe, An Assessment of Mercosur's Present Legal Framework and Institutions and






31. Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 16, art. 1. See generally Charles Chatterjee, The Treaty of Asuncion:
An Analysis, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 63 (1992).
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of goods:' (2) the "establishment of a common external tariff and the adoption of a com-
mon trade policy in relation to third States or groups of States, and the coordination of
positions in regional and international economic and commercial forums' (3) the "coor-
dination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies," and (4) a commitment "to harmonize"
domestic law in relevant areas. 32 The path chosen by the MERCOSUR nations to reach
this goal is to begin as a free trade area and evolve gradually into a customs union and,
finally, into a full-fledged common market. To show the strength of their commitment to
integration, the MERCOSUR parties originally pledged to form a common market by
December 1994, less than four years after signing the Treaty of Asuncion. 33 Although a
South American customs union did not come to pass by 1994, the MERCOSUR parties
succeeded in forming a limited customs union by January 1, 1995.34
B. MERCOSUR's EVOLVING INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE.
The Treaty of Asuncion is a framework document intended to guide the member
states' evolution toward a common market over the course of a defined transition peri-
od.35 For this reason the Treaty envisions that the institutional structure of MERCOSUR
will transform over time, becoming increasingly sophisticated as the parties' economies
become increasingly integrated.36 In theory, MERCOSUR will utilize a different institu-
tional structure as it moves from one stage of integration to another, from a free trade area
to a customs union and, finally, to a common market.
32. Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 16, arts. I & 5; Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 16, at Annex I:
Trade Liberalization Programme.
33. Id at art. 3. As one commentator explains:
The decision to speed up integration was made for political reasons. From the very
beginning, and quite understandably, there was considerable skepticism regarding
the possibility of establishing a common market in such a short time. Yet, the very
ambitiousness of the project was intended to demonstrate the seriousness with
which the four presidents approached the task of regional integration. In turn, the
deadlines were chosen in order to coincide with the end of the presidential terms of
Menem, Collor de Mello, Rodriguez, and La Calle. In so doing, the outgoing presi-
dents hoped to lock their successors into the integration process ....
Manzetti, supra note 10, at 106.
34. See Latin America-Chile, Bolivia Seek Mercosur Entry; Other Developments, WORLD NEWS
DIGEST, Jan. 19, 1995, at 28 ("The customs union eliminated tariffs on more than 90% of goods
traded among the four member nations and put in place common tariffs-averaging 12 0/--on
imports from outside the trade bloc. Some 10% of goods were exempted from both the internal
and the common external tariffs, but the exceptions were to be phased out no later than the year
2001:); Thomas A. O'Keefe, Recent Developments in the MERCOSUR, 3 LATIN AMER. L. & Bus.
REP. 26, May 31, 1995, at 26 [hereinafter Recent Developments].
35. See Alejandro Pastori, The Institutions of MERCOSUR: From the Treaty of Asuncion to the Protocol
ofOuro Preto, 6 INTER-AMERiCAN LEGAL MATERIALS 1, 1 (1995).
36. See OTERMIN, supra note 23, at 18 ("El criterio imperante, pero no el 6inico, fue el de no adelan-
tarse a los tiempos, e ir por tanto creando las instituciones acompasadamente con las etapas del
proceso de integraci6n).
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1. The Free Trade Area Structure - November 1991 to December 1994.
The Treaty of Asuncion created three bodies--the Council of the Common Market,
the Common Market Group, and an Administrative Secretariat-to administer and imple-
ment MERCOSUR from its inception to the end of 1994.37 The Council is MERCOSUR's
supreme institution. 38 It is composed of eight individuals, the ministers of foreign affairs
and ministers of the economy of the four member states, and is responsible for
MERCOSUR's "political leadership and for decision-making to ensure compliance with
the objectives and time-limits set for the final establishment of the common market "' 39
MERCOSUR's sixteen-member Common Market Group ("CMG") consists of four rep-
resentatives of each nation's ministry of foreign affairs, economic ministry, and central
bank.40 Its role is to monitor the member states' compliance with the Treaty, enforce deci-
sions adopted by the Council, and formulate programs to ensure progress towards the goal
of a common market 4 1 In addition to their status as CMG members, the CMG representa-
tives of each country constitute their respective country's National Section of the CMG.42
The Treaty of Asuncion created an Administrative Secretariat as an arm of the
CMG. 43 The role of the Secretariat, which is located in Montevideo, is to maintain the
CMG's documents, report on the CMG's activities, and otherwise support the work of the
CMG.44 From 1991 to 1994, the work of the Secretariat was substantially hampered by
virtue of the fact that it was unfunded, leaving Uruguay to bear all of the Secretariat's start-
up and operating expenses. 45
The MERCOSUR parties expressly provided that all decisions of the Council and
CMG are to be made "by consensus, with all States Parties present."46 In this context, con-
sensus does not necessarily require unanimity; rather, consensus exists in MERCOSUR so
long as all parties are present and no party casts a negative vote, even if one or more of the
participants abstains. 47
2. The Customs Union Structure - January 1995 to the Present
Technically, effective January 1, 1995, the Ouro Preto Protocol added three new bod-
ies, the MERCOSUR Trade Commission, the Joint Parliamentary Commission, and the
37. Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 16, art. 9.
38. Id. at art. 10.
39. Id. at art. 10-11.
40. Id. at art. 13.
41. Id. at art. 13-14.
42. See OTERMIN, supra note 23, at 21.
43. Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 16, art. 15.
44. i at art 15; OTERMIN, supra note 23, at 26.
45. See OTERMIN, supra note 23, at 89 ("Durante estos tres afhos de vida transcurridos del Mercosur, ]a
Secretaria ha funcionado sin un presupuesto, corriendo todos sus gastos de estructura y fun-
cionamiento a cargo del Uruguay:).
46. Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 16, art. 16.
47. See OTERMIN, supra note 23, at 22 ("En el consenso, no es necesario que todos los miembros
deban votar, puede haber quien se abstenga, bastando que no se oponga a la decisi6n a tomar.");
Juan M. Vacchino, Assessing Institutional Capacities, in THE CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATION: EUROPE
AND THE AMERICAS 305,318 (Peter H. Smith ed., 1993).
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Economic and Social Consultative Forum, to MERCOSUR's pre-existing structure.48 The
Trade Commission consists of four representatives of each member state. 49 Like the
Council and CMG, the Trade Commission possesses official decision-making authority. 50
The duties of the Trade Commission include monitoring the application of agreements
respecting trade within MERCOSUR and between MERCOSUR and third-parties, polic-
ing compliance with the common external tariff, and performing other tasks related to
MERCOSUR's common trade policies.5' In addition, the Trade Commission may receive
and consider complaints by a member state or private party that fall within the Trade
Commission's "sphere of competence" and that are referred to it by one of its National
Sections.52 The Trade Commission is required to meet at least monthly as well as when
requested by the CMG or any member state.5 3
The Joint Parliamentary Commission represents the national parliaments of the four
MERCOSUR parties. 54 "It consists of sixty-four members, sixteen from each member
country, who are appointed for periods of no less than two years by their respective
national parliaments' 55 Its purpose is to accelerate the effectuation of decisions made by
the MERCOSUR organs, assist in the harmonization of domestic laws, and act "as a con-
duit to national parliaments and to the people as a whole."5 6
The Economic and Social Consultative Forum ("ESCF") represents the "economic
and social sectors" of each member state.57 Its role is to advise the CMG on economic and
social matters.5 8
In addition to supplementing MERCOSUR's institutional structure, the Ouro Preto
Protocol accomplished several other critical objectives. First, it formally conferred "legal
personality of international law" on MERCOSUR, authorizing it to "take whatever action
may be necessary to achieve its objectives, in particular [to] sign contracts, buy and sell
personal and real property, appear in court, hold funds and make transfers."5 9 Second, the
48. Ouro Preto Protocol, supra note 24, art. 1; see also Ana Maria de Aguinis, Can MERCOSUR
Accede to NAFTA?A Legal Perspective, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 597,609 (1995).
49. Ouro Preto Protocol, supra note 24, art. 17.
50. Id. at arts. 2.
51. Id. at arts. 16 & 19.
52. Id. at art. 21. Just as the CMG representatives of each member state constitute that state's
National Section of the CMG, the Trade Commission representatives of each member state are
deemed to constitute that state's National Section of the Trade Commission. Id.
53. Id. at art. 18.
54. Id. at art. 22.
55. Vacchino, supra note 47, at 316; Ouro Preto Protocol, supra note 24, arts. 23-24.
56. Vacchino, supra note 47, at 317; Ouro Preto Protocol, supra note 24, art. 25.
57. Ouro Preto Protocol, supra note 24, art. 28.
58. Id. at art? 29.
59. Id. at arts. 34-35. Prior to the Ouro Preto Protocol, MERCOSUR's legal capacity to enter interna-
tional agreements with third parties was in question. See Pastori, supra note 35, at 3; Thomas A.
O'Keefe, Recent Developments in the Andean Pact Affecting North American Investors and
Exporters, 4 LATIN AM. L. & Bus. REp., Feb. 29, 1996, at 24, 26. "Now, with the creation of the
Customs Union (which implies among other things a common trade policy, a common external
tariff and joint international negotiations) it is indispensable that this Customs Union be inter-
nationally responsible for the legal actions it carries out with third parties that are subjects of
international law." Pastori, supra note 35, at 3.
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Ouro Preto Protocol expanded the powers of the Council to include the power to "assume
the legal personality of" MERCOSUR and to negotiate and sign agreements with third
countries, groups of countries, and international organizations on behalf of
MERCOSUR. 60 Further, the Ouro Preto Protocol clarified that the decisions of
MERCOSUR's three primary institutions (the Council, CMG, and Trade Commission)
"shall be taken by consensus and in the presence of all the States Parties" and "shall be
binding upon the States Parties." 6 1 Article 42 of the Ouro Preto Protocol expressly states:
"The decisions adopted by the Mercosur organs provided for in Article 2 of this Protocol
.shall be binding and, when necessary, must be incorporated in the domestic legal systems
in accordance with the procedures provided for in each country's legislation.'
6 2
3. The Common Market Structure
Clearly, MERCOSUR's present structure does not include supranational institutions
such as the European Council, Parliament, or Court of Justice. 63 Indeed, MERCOSUR's
present institutions, with the exception of the Secretariat, consist of little more than for-
malized meetings of representatives from pre-existing agencies of each member state.64
One commentator labels this an "intergovernmental structure;' as distinct from a structure
consisting of newly-created supranational institutions. 65 In theory, however,
MERCOSUR's final institutional structure will include one or more permanent, indepen-
dent bodies having supranational authority.
Recently, the member states agreed "in principle" to establish a MERCOSUR Court of
Justice to adjudicate trade disputes but did not agree on the timing of its creation.66 Brazil
is the lone opponent to the Court's formation, arguing that "it is too early for such an
institution to be created' 67 Apparently, it will be some time before MERCOSUR evolves
into its final common market structure.
60. Ouro Preto Protocol, supra note 24, art. 8 (III) & (IV).
61. Id. atarts. 2,9, 15,20,&37.
62. Id. at art. 42.
63. See Manzetti, supra note 10, at 118.
64. As Professor Manzetti explains: "The path chosen so far has relied upon intra-governmental bod-
ies and existing institutions, rather than new supra-governmental structures, to further its
progress. The only permanent institution created to date is the Administrative Secretariat, locat-
ed in Montevideo (Uruguay), whose primary task is to supply documents and information
regarding new protocols and agreements to the member countries." Manzetti, supra note 10, at
117-18. According to Professor Abbott, the decision to provide a minimal institutional structure
for MERCOSUR was deliberate and intended to avoid the creation of new "regional bureaucra-
cies" of the type, officials thought, that partially were to blame for the failure of prior Latin
American integration schemes. See FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, LAW AND POLICY OF REGIONAL
INTEGRATION: THE NAFTA AND WESTERN HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION SYSTEM 176-77 (1995).
65. See Vacchino, supra note 47, at 319.
66. See MERCOSUR Countries to Establish Supranational Bank and Court, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
980 (June 12,1996).
67. Id.
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C. COMPARISON TO THE PURPOSES AND INSTITUTIONS OF NAFTA.
In contrast to MERCOSUR's goal of forming a common market, the limited purpose
of NAFTA is to create a free trade area composed of Canada, Mexico, and the United
States. While it is true that NAFTA is comprehensive in the sense that it seeks to cover all
trade between the three countries as well as related environmental and labor concerns, the
Agreement's core purpose is to eliminate all tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade between
the three countries over a fifteen-year transition period. 68 NAFTA is not intended to pro-
duce a North American customs union, common market, or federalized state.69
Collectively, NAFTA and its sibling agreements-the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation ("Environmental Side Agreement") 70 and North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation ("Labor Side Agreement") 71 -- create a tripartite system
of institutions. The core institutions responsible for administering NAFTA are the Free
Trade Commission and Secretariat.72 The Commission, which is composed of cabinet-
level officials of the NAFTA parties, is responsible for supervising the Agreement's imple-
mentation and resolving disputes concerning its interpretation or application.73 The role
of the Secretariat, which consists of a National Section office in each NAFTA country, is to
supply administrative support to the Free Trade Commission. 74
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation is administered by
the Commission for Environmental Cooperation ("CEC"), which consists of a Council,
Secretariat, and Joint Public Advisory Committee.75 The Environmental Council com-
prises cabinet-level officials of the three countries. 76 The Environmental Secretariat,
which is based in Montreal, Canada, provides technical, administrative, and operational
support to the Council.77 The fifteen-member Joint Public Advisory Committee may
advise the Council on "any matter within the scope" of the Environmental Side Agreement
and "provide relevant technical, scientific or other information to the Secretariat."78
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation is administered by the
Commission for Labor Cooperation ("CLC"), which consists of a Council and Secretariat,
and National Administrative Offices ("NAOs") in each country.79 The Labor Council com-
prises the labor ministers of the three NAFTA countries.80 The Labor Secretariat, which is
68. NAFTA, supra note 7, art. 102(1)(a). Other related yet secondary trade goals of NAFTA include the
promotion of fair competition, investment, and intellectual property protection. Id. at art. 102(1).
69. See GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE: ISSUES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 6-9 (1992).
70. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC].
71. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M.
1499 [hereinafter NAALC].
72. NAFTA, supra note 7, arts. 2001 & 2002. In addition, NAFrA provides for the creation of numer-
ous committees and working groups. I& at Annex 2001.2.
73. Id. at art. 2001(1)-(2).
74. Id. at art. 2002.
75. NAAEC, supra note 70, art. 8(1)-(2).
76. Id. at art. 9(1).
77. Id. at art. 11(5).
78. Id. at art. 16(4)-(5).
79. NAALC, supra note 71, art. 8.
80. Id. at art. 9(1).
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based in Dallas, Texas, assists and supports the Council.81 The NAOs, which are located in
Washington, D.C., Mexico City, and Hull, Quebec, serve as points of contact with one
another, with the Labor Secretariat, and with governmental agencies of the parties.8 2
The NAFTA institutions differ from those of MERCOSUR in a number of ways. First,
NAFTA does not contemplate that its organizational structure is an evolving one, moving
ever closer to a more integrated, supranational structure. In the decades to come, NAFTA's
organizations may be displaced by new trinational or hemispheric entities but NAFTA is
not a "framework" document and there is no provision in NAFTA or the side agreements
for evolution to a higher form of economic integration. Second, no one institution is
supreme as to all NAFTA-related matters. Clearly, the Free Trade Commission has ulti-
mate authority with respect to matters within the Agreement; however, the Environmental
and Labor Commissions are the governing bodies of their respective fields of compe-
tence.8 3 There is no provision in the side agreements that allows the Free Trade
Commission to trump decisions of the other Commissions. Third, NAFTA utilizes de-
centralized National Section offices of the NAFTA Secretariat, which each nation is
responsible for funding, and separate Secretariats for each of the side agreements, whereas
MERCOSUR utilizes a single Secretariat office (located in Montevideo), which Uruguay
has had to struggle to fund on its own. Fourth, NAFTA has no analog to MERCOSUR's
Joint Parliamentary Commission. This may be due, in part, to the fact that "harmoniza-
tion of domestic laws" is an essential part of MERCOSUR's evolution toward a common
market but is not formally a part of NAFTA's creation of a free trade area. Fifth, unlike the
MERCOSUR Council, neither the Free Trade Commission nor any other official NAFTA-
related institution has any authority to negotiate and sign agreements with non-NAFTA
countries or groups, absent the independent approval of the three NAFTA partners. 84
Sixth, the decisions of NAFTAs institutions are not of the same legal effect as those of
MERCOSUR's institutions. Whereas the Ouro Preto Protocol makes decisions by MER-
COSUR organs "binding" and mandates that they be "incorporated in the domestic legal
systems" of the member states, decisions of the NAFTA organs generally are not binding.85
NAFT's institutional structure is similar to that of MERCOSUR in two major ways.
First, determinations by the decision-making groups (i.e., the Free Trade Commission,
Environmental Council, Labor Council, Council of the Common Market, CMG, and
MERCOSUR Trade Commission) are to be made by "consensus.' Second, neither NAFTA
nor MERCOSUR currently possesses supranational authorities like those of the European
Community. With the exception of the four Secretariats, which are wholly new agencies
that are independent and, for the most part, active and functioning, the NAFTA and MER-
81. Id.at art. 13(1).
82. Id. atart. 16(1).
83. NAAEC, supra note 70, art. 10(1); NAALC, supra note 71, art. 10(1).
84. Of course, Mexico, Canada, and the United States have joined as "NAFTA" to attempt to invite
non-NAFTA parties, such as Chile, to accede to the Agreement; however, this is the three partners
acting together but not as a distinct "legal personality of international law" in the way MERCO-
SUR became entitled to act under the Ouro Preto Protocol.
85. Exceptions to this general principle include Chapter 19 binational panel decisions and Chapter
11 investment panel rulings, which are binding on the disputing parties. See NAFTA, supra note
7, at arts. 1904(9) & 1136(1).
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COSUR institutions are more like formalized meetings of representatives from pre-exist-
ing governmental agencies.86
III. The Dispute Resolution Processes of MERCOSUR.
Just as MERCOSUR's institutional structure has evolved, so too has its dispute resolu-
tion system. The March 1991 Treaty of Asuncion created a temporary dispute settlement
structure that the member states could use pending the creation of a second, more intri-
cate dispute resolution system for use during the transition period, prior to the formation
of the common market.87 In December 1991, the four countries signed the Protocol of
Brasilia for the Resolution of Controversies ("Brasilia Protocol"). 88 The "transitional" dis-
pute resolution mechanisms set forth in the Brasilia Protocol entered into force and dis-
placed the Treaty of Asuncion's temporary system in April 1993.89 Effective January 1995,
the Ouro Preto Protocol augmented the Brasilia Protocol by introducing the MERCOSUR
Trade Commission as an additional dispute resolution authority. The specific parameters
of each of these dispute resolution structures is examined below.
A. MERCOSUR's INITIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM -
NOVEMBER 1991 TO APRIL 1993.
The temporary dispute resolution scheme set forth in the Treaty of Asuncion was in
place in MERCOSUR from November 1991 to April 1993. This initial, extremely elemen-
tary system involved a three-step dispute resolution process for the settlement of disputes,
beginning with "direct negotiations" between the disputing countries, leading to evalua-
tion by the CMG, and, failing resolution at these early stages, to review by the Council.90
Although the MERCOSUR countries did not set any time restriction on the duration of
direct negotiations or Council review, the Treaty of Asuncion required the CMG to act
within sixty days after receiving the dispute.9 1
The scope of the preliminary system was limited strictly to conflicts between the
member states arising "as a result of the application of the Treaty." 92 No provision was
made for the settlement of disputes between a member state and private party, a MERCO-
SUR institution and private party, a member state and a MERCOSUR institution, or exclu-
sively between private parties.93
86. See Vacchino, supra note 47, at 321 (describing NAFTA's Free Trade Commission as an "intergov-
ernmental" institution).
87. See Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 16, Annex Ii(2)-(3).
88. Protocol of Brasilia for the Resolution of Controversies, Dec. 12, 1991, 6 INTER-AM.LEGAL
MATERIALS 1 (1992) [hereinafter Brasilia Protocol].
89. OrERIN, supra note 23, at 29 ("En consecuencia, el primer sistema ... rigi6 desde el 29 de noviem-
bre de 1991 ... hasta que entrara en vigencia el Protocolo de Brasilia, 22 de abril de 1993...')
90. Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 16, Annex III(1).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See OTERMIN, supra note 23, at 30.
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B. MERCOSUR's TRANSITIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM -
APRIL 1993 TO THE PRESENT.
The dispute resolution mechanism in effect in MERCOSUR since April 1993 provides
for the resolution of two general types of controversies: those between member states ("gov-
ernment-to-government" or "public" disputes) and those between private firms or individ-
uals and a member state ("private/public" disputes). Elements of this transitional system
were drawn from a variety of pre-existing trade agreements, including those between the
United States and Canada, Mexico and Chile, and other Latin American countries.94
1. Public Dispute Settlement.
Pursuant to the Brasilia and Ouro Preto Protocols, MERCOSUR's dispute resolution
system may be invoked to attempt to resolve any controversy between the member states
concerning the interpretation, application, or breach of the Treaty of Asuncion, its related
accords, or any decision of the Council, CMG, or Trade Commission. 95 The precise dis-
pute resolution procedures involved vary somewhat, depending on whether the matter at
issue is within the Trade Commission's "sphere of competence."
A conflict that falls outside the Trade Commission's purview is subject to a three-stage
dispute resolution process involving: (1) direct negotiations, (2) intervention by the CMG,
and (3) binding arbitration.96 The disputants are required to begin attempts toward set-
tlement by means of direct negotiations. 97 Absent a mutually agreed upon extension,
direct negotiations are not to last beyond fifteen days from the date on which negotiations
were requested. 98
If no resolution or only a partial resolution is reached in direct negotiations, any dis-
putant may submit the controversy to the CMG.99 No later than thirty days from the date
of submission, the CMG is to evaluate the situation, giving the parties an opportunity to
present their respective views, and make recommendations to resolve the dispute.100 To
avoid delay in situations in which it is difficult for the CMG to reach consensus, the
Brasilia Protocol authorizes the CMG, at its discretion, to refer a dispute to a panel of three
experts.10 1 The experts are to be drawn from a pre-established roster of twenty-four per-
sons of recognized competence in areas of possible controversy, each MERCOSUR country
having named six persons to the roster.10 2
When neither direct negotiations nor CMG intervention resolves a public dispute, any
disputant may notify the Administrative Secretariat of its intention to resort to arbitral
proceedings. 10 3 Each controversy is to be assigned to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal com-
94. Id. at 31-32.
95. Brasilia Protocol, supra note 88, art. 1; Ouro Preto Protocol, supra note 24, art. 43.
96. Brasilia Protocol, supra note 88, chs. 2-4. See also OTERMIN, supra note 23, at 48-51.
97. Brasilia Protocol, supra note 88, art. 2.
98. Id. at art. 3(2).
99. Id. at art. 4(1).
100. Id. at arts. 4(2)-6.
101. See OTERMIN, supra note 23, at 49 ("Por ello aquf, como en otras oportunidades, se recurre al
asesoramiento de expertos, de modo de obtener una opini6n que no est condicionada por el
consenso7).
102. Brasilia Protocol, supra note 88, art. 30.
103. Id. at art. 7(1).
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posed of three arbitrators. 104 Within fifteen days after the Secretariat has issued notice of
the request for arbitration, the arbitrators are to be selected from a pre-formed list of forty
qualified judges, each country having named ten judges to the list. 105 Each disputant des-
ignates one arbitrator and the third (who must not be a national of either disputant) is
chosen by agreement of the first two designees. 106 The Brasilia Protocol guarantees the
disputants full due process rights, permits each disputant to select its own counsel, and
authorizes arbitral tribunals to issue provisional relief to maintain the status quo or pre-
vent injury.107
Ordinarily within sixty days, and in no case longer than ninety days, the arbitral tri-
bunal is to issue a written decision. 108 The decision shall be by majority vote, although the
precise vote count for or against the decision is to remain confidential. 109 Decisions of the
arbitral tribunals cannot be appealed and the disputants are obliged to respect them as
being final.1 10 The disputing parties are to comply with the tribunal's decision within fif-
teen days, unless the tribunal sets another time limit." 1l In the event a disputant fails to
comply with a tribunal's decision within thirty days, the other disputant(s) may adopt
"temporary compensatory measures," such as the suspension of trade concessions or other
equivalent steps designed to obtain compliance.l12
The dispute resolution process is slightly more complicated when a matter falls within
the "sphere of competence" of the Trade Commission. In such cases, complaints are to be
submitted by the complaining nation to its National Section of the Trade Commission
which, in turn, tenders it to the Chairman of the Trade Commission.11 3 At the next sched-
uled meeting of the Trade Commission, the commissioners are either (1) to make an
immediate decision on the complaint or (2) refer it to a committee of experts for an opin-
ion on the underlying question, following the receipt of which the commissioners are to
rule on the complaint. 114 In the event consensus cannot be reached, the Trade
Commission shall submit the complaint, the experts' opinion, and the "various alternatives
proposed" to the CMG. n 5 The CMG is required to rule on the complaint within thirty
days thereafter.116
104. Id. at art. 9(1).
105. Id. at arts. 9(2)(I), 10 & 13.
106. Id. at art. 9(2)(1).
107. Id. at arts. 15-18.
108. Id. at art. 20(1). The Protocol specifies that the sources of law to be used by arbitrators in render-
ing decisions are the Treaty of Asuncion, its related accords, decisions of the Council, resolutions
of the CMG, and applicable international law. Id. at art. 19.
109. Id. at art. 20(2).
110. Id. at art. 2 1(1). The parties to the Brasilia Protocol expressly acknowledged and assented to the
authority of the arbitral tribunals to adjudicate controversies encompassed by the Protocol. Id. at
art. 8.
111. Id. at art. 21(2).
112. Id. at art. 23.
113. Ouro Preto Protocol, supra note 24, at Annex, arts. 1-2.
114. Id. at Annex, arts. 2-4. The committee of experts is to take no more than thirty days to prepare
and submit a joint opinion or set of conclusions to the Trade Commission. Id. at Annex, art. 3.
115. Id. at art. 5.
116. Id.
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If either the Trade Commission or CMG rules that the complaint is justified, the
offending country shall "adopt the measures approved" by the reviewing body.117 In the
event the offending country fails timely to comply with the ruling, the complaining nation
may initiate arbitral proceedings as provided for other public disputes."18 If neither the
Trade Commission nor the CMG can reach the consensus necessary to rule on a com-
plaint, the complaining nation likewise may resort to binding arbitral proceedings. 119
2. Private/Public Dispute Settlement.
In addition to creating a regime for the resolution of government-to-government dis-
putes, MERCOSUR provides for the settlement of certain disputes between private indi-
viduals and member countries. 120 A natural or legal person affected by a country's breach
of the Treaty of Asuncion, its related accords, Council decisions, CMG resolutions, or
Trade Commission directives may present a claim to the National Section of the CMG or
Trade Commission of the country in which the person resides or has its business head-
quarters.121
In the event the question presented by a person is not already the subject of govern-
ment-to-government dispute resolution proceedings and falls outside the "sphere of com-
petence" of the Trade Commission, the National Section of the CMG receiving the claim
may take it up "as its own" and either (1) contact the National Section of the alleged viola-
tor directly for purposes of discussing an immediate resolution or (2) raise the claim
before the CMG. 122 In its first meeting following receipt of the claim, the CMG may reject
the claim as being procedurally defective or may accept the claim and immediately refer it
to a panel of three experts, which is to issue appropriate findings within thirty days after
being assembled. 123 The panelists are selected by a vote of the CMG from the pre-formed
roster of twenty-four experts mentioned previously.124 The person asserting the claim and
the country against which the claim is made are entitled to present arguments to the
panel.1 25
If expert findings returned to the CMG verify the private party's claim, any member
country may demand that the violator take corrective steps or annul the measure in ques-
117. Id. at art. 6.
118. Id. (referring to Brasilia Protocol, ch. IV).
119. Id. at art. 7.
120. Such private/public controversies are distinct from commercial disputes solely between private
businesses from the MERCOSUR countries. Purely private disputes are handled outside
MERCOSUR's structure through traditional litigation, arbitration, conciliation or mediation. See
Juan C. Viterbori, Soluci6n de controversias en d sistema de Mercosur, LA LEY, Jan. 27, 1995, at 1, 2.
121. Brasilia Protocol, supra note 88, arts. 25-26(1); Ouro Preto Protocol, supra note 24, art. 43.
122. Brasilia Protocol, supra note 88, art. 27; Pastori, supra note 35, at 2. A matter initially discussed
with the National Section of the alleged violator that is not resolved by consultation within fif-
teen days may, thereafter, be raised before the CMG. Brasilia Protocol, supra note 88, art. 28.
123. Id. at art. 29.
124. See text accompanying note 102, supra. The Brasilia Protocol stipulates that at least one of the
three panelists must be a person who is not a national of either the alleged violator or country
which sponsored the claim. Brasilia Protocol, supra note 88, art. 30(1).
125. Id. at art. 29(3).
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tion.1 26 If that demand is not met within fifteen days, the country making the demand
may resort directly to the arbitral proceedings created for resolving government-to-gov-
ernment disputes. 127
If a private/public controversy falls within the authority of the Trade Commission, the
private party submits its complaint to the appropriate National Section of the Trade
Commission. 128 Thereafter, dispute resolution proceeds in the same manner described for
public controversies within the Trade Commission's "sphere of competence." 129
C. COMPARISON TO THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES OF NAFTA.
NAFTA's three primary accords-the NAFTA itself, the Environmental Side
Agreement, and the Labor Side Agreement-include a variety of dispute resolution
processes. Within NAFTA, the two most significant dispute resolution structures are those
of Chapter 20, which applies to controversies concerning the interpretation, application or
breach of the Agreement, and Chapter 19, which deals with anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duty disputes.130
In general terms, Chapter 20 constructs a three-stage dispute resolution process that
escalates from consultations, to a meeting of the Free Trade Commission, to nonbinding
arbitration, as necessary. 131 Assuming a dispute works its way through consultations and
the Free Trade Commission to an arbitral finding against a NAFTA country, the disputing
countries are to reach a "mutually satisfactory resolution" 132 If this does not occur within
thirty days of the arbitral panel's final report, the complaining party may suspend NAFTA
benefits to the offending party until such time as an agreed resolution is reached. 133
Pursuant to Chapter 19, a private Canadian, Mexican, or American business subject to
a final antidumping determination of one of the three governments may request that the
determination be reviewed by a binational arbitral panel. 134 Chapter 19 panels are
charged with assessing "whether such determination was in accordance with the
antidumping or countervailing duty law of the importing Party."1 35 A panel ruling that a
final determination is not in compliance with the importing Party's law is binding on the
Party.136 "No Party may provide in its domestic legislation for an appeal from a panel
decision to its domestic courts."137
126. It at art. 32.
127. Id. at art. 32.
128. Ouro Preto Protocol, supra note 24, Annex, arts. 102.
129. See text accompanying notes 113-116, supra.
130. Aside from the dispute resolution processes set forth in Chapters 19 and 20, NAFTA provides for
other forms of dispute settlement such as in~the case of investment disputes between a NAFTA
investor and one of the countries, see NAFTA, supra note 7, Ch. 11, and between a financial ser-
vices provider and one of the countries, see NAFTA, Ch. 14.
131. NAFTA, supra note 7, arts. 2006-2008.
132. Id. at art. 2019.
133. Id. at art. 2019(1).
134. Id. at arts. 1904(2) & 1911.
135. Id. at art. 1904(2).
136. Id. at art. 1904(9).
137. Id. at art. 1904(11). Chapter 19 includes an extensive set of procedures for ensuring that the
member states comply with panel rulings. Id at art. 1905.
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The Environmental Side Agreement provides for the resolution of two general types
of controversies: those not involving allegations that a NAFTA government has failed to
enforce its environmental laws ("non-enforcement matters") and those wherein a govern-
ment's failure to enforce its environmental laws is directly at issue ("enforcement mat-
ters").138 The category of enforcement matters further is divided into cases of mere failure
to enforce environmental laws and a "persistent pattern" of failure to enforce environmen-
tal laws. 139 As to all cases other than "persistent pattern" cases, the only measures available
to the Environmental Secretariat are to conduct an investigation, subject to limitation by
the Council, and to prepare a report, potentially for distribution to the public. 140 Disputes
involving allegations of a "persistent pattern" of failure to enforce environmental laws are
subject to a more intricate settlement process, involving consultations, a special session of
the Council, and ultimately an arbitral panel. 14 1 Assuming it does not occur voluntarily,
compliance with adverse determinations by an arbitral panel is to be obtained by imposing
a "monetary enforcement assessment" on the offending country or suspending NAFTA
benefits to it. 1
42
The Labor Side Agreement creates a four-step dispute settlement process that pro-
gresses sequentially from initial consultations between NAOs, to ministerial consultations,
to expert evaluations, and to further consultations that may lead to nonbinding arbitra-
tion, as necessary.143 A broadly defined category of "labor law" matters may be subjected
to the first two steps, NAO and ministerial consultations. 144 A smaller category of labor-
related controversies may proceed to expert evaluation. 145 And only three types of labor
controversies, those involving occupational safety and health, child labor, or minimum
wage concerns, may advance to the fourth stage of dispute settlement. 146 As is the case
with respect to environmental cases, assuming compliance with a labor panel's ruling does
not occur voluntarily, compliance is to be obtained by imposing a "monetary enforcement
assessment" on the offending country, and if that fails to earn compliance, by suspending
NAFTA benefits to it.147
NAFTA's initial and current dispute resolution structures are broader in scope, more
complex, and far more detailed than MERCOSUR's initial dispute settlement structures.
NAFTIs primary dispute resolution devices apply to controversies surrounding the inter-
pretation and application of NAFTA, antidumping conflicts, and environmental and labor
disputes. In contrast, for the first eighteen months of MERCOSUR's existence, only dis-
putes involving the application of the Treaty of Asuncion were susceptible to resolution
with MERCOSUR. The expansion of MERCOSUR's dispute settlement capacity in April
1993, pursuant to the Brasilia Protocol, broadened the scope of disputes resolvable within
138. NAAEC, supra note 70, arts. 13-15 & 22-36.
139. Id. at arts. 14-15 & 22-36.
140. Id. at art. 15.
141. Id. at arts. 22-34.
142. Id. at arts. 34(5) & 36(1).
143. NAALC supra note 71, at Pts. 4 & 5.
144. Id. at arts. 21(1) &22(1).
145. Id. at art. 23.
146. Id. at art. 27(1).
147. Id. at arts. 39(4) & 41.
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MERCOSUR. Presently, disputes concerning the "interpretation, application, or breach" of
all of the MERCOSUR accords as well as the decisions of the MERCOSUR institutions are
within the subject matter authority of the group's dispute settlement processes.
Nevertheless, antidumping duty, environmental, and labor conflicts between the member
states are not expressly susceptible to resolution within MERCOSUR. In short, one sees
Chapter 20-like processes within MERCOSUR but no direct analogs to the dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms of NAFTA Chapter 19 or the side agreements.
As in the case of Chapter 20, MERCOSUR controversies generally may progress along
a three-tiered path, from direct negotiations to ministerial intervention to arbitration;
however, MERCOSUR arbitration formally is binding on the disputants, whereas Chapter
20 arbitration is not. Like Chapter 20 panels, those within MERCOSUR are ad hoc and
drawn from pre-formed rosters; however, MERCOSUR panels consist of only three arbi-
trators, not five as in the case of NAFTA. In the same way, the ultimate means of com-
pelling compliance with panel determinations under both NAFTA and MERCOSUR lies in
the suspension of trade concessions.
A final point of similarity is that MERCOSUR and NAFTA both provide for the reso-
lution of "public" and "private/public" disputes. NAFTA Chapter 19 cases as well as many
of those under the side agreements involve private individuals or entities as formal partici-
pants. Private MERCOSUR citizens or entities too may initiate dispute settlement pro-
ceedings to the extent they are affected by the group's underlying accords or decisions of its
institutions. As with Chapter 19 disputes under NAFTA, private/public disputes potential-
ly are subject to binding arbitration within MERCOSUR.
IV. Early Dispute Resolution Experience Under MERCOSUR.
MERCOSUR and its initial dispute resolution processes entered into force in
November 1991. Since then, numerous trade-related disputes have arisen among the par-
ties. Surprisingly, few of these controversies appear to have been submitted to
MERCOSUR's formal dispute resolution systems for settlement. The reasons underlying
the parties' reluctance to utilize the MERCOSUR structures and ways in which the early
dispute resolution experience in MERCOSUR differs from the early experience under
NAFTA are examined below.
A. TRADE-RELATED DIsPuTs ARISING BETWEEN NOVEMBER 1991 AND SEPTEMBER 1996.
From November 1991 to September 1996, a variety of trade-related disputes arose
between the MERCOSUR parties. Generally, these fell into four distinct categories: dis-
putes concerning barriers to internal trade, conflicts relating to MERCOSUR's common
external tariff, antidumping and countervailing duty disputes, and disputes concerning
intellectual property protection.
At least four major controversies concerning barriers to internal trade arose. First, in
November 1992, Argentina imposed a "statistical tax" of three to ten percent ad valorem
on all imports, including those from the other three MERCOSUR countries. 148
148. See Progress Toward Economic Integration Continues to Elude MERCOSUR Members, 10 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 663 (Apr. 21, 1993) [hereinafter Progress].
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"Paraguayan officials threatened to withdraw their country from the MERCOSUR negoti-
ations if Argentina did not lift its tax:' 149 Second, in December 1993 Argentina banned
the importation of Brazilian beef and pork, ostensibly to protect against disease; in
response, Brazil threatened to suspend imports of fruit from Argentina for "health rea-
sons:' 150 Next, in June 1995 Brazil announced that it intended to impose quotas on auto-
mobile imports, including those from Argentina, so as to drastically cut such imports.
1 51
Finally, in May 1996, Brazil announced plans to resurrect "financial guarantee" require-
ments on 500 different types of textile and clothing imports from Uruguay that previously
had been eliminated under the MERCOSUR agreements.152 Aside from these relatively
significant controversies, many smaller internal trade matters also plagued MERCO-
SUR.153
Apparently, many antidumping disputes arose between the parties during
MERCOSUR's first five years of existence. For example, in July 1993 Argentina, unilateral-
ly and without the prior consultation required under certain "complementary economy
agreements," imposed antidumping duties and quotas on a wide variety of imports from
Brazil, including automobile parts and steel. 154 Moreover, from January 1995 to May 1996
alone, at least fourteen antidumping cases involving Brazilian goods were filed with the
Argentine Trade Secretariat 155
The effort to form a common external tariff has been the source of numerous disputes
within MERCOSU1, In 1993, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay experienced some dis-
agreement with Brazil in setting a common tariff for "sensitive" items such as automobiles,
telecommunications equipment, and petrochemicals. 156 In November 1994, controversy
149. Manzetti, supra note 10, at 136 n.5.
150. See MERCOSUR Lowers Internal Import Duties; Brazil, Argentina Trade Charges, Bans, 11 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 58 (Jan. 12, 1994).
151. See Angus Foster, Car Curbs Row Ends Mercosur Honeymoon, FIN. TIMES, June 21, 1995, at 5;
Americas Drift, supra note 8, at 35.
152. See Uruguay: Economy Expected to Remain Stagnant in 1996 Following Poor Performance in 1995,
NotiSur-Latin American Political Affairs, May 24, 1996, available in WESTLAW, Latnews
Database, 1996 WL 8089400 [hereinafter Uruguay Economy].
153. Even as late as May 1995 (five months after the formal birth of the customs union), many non-
tariff barriers remained between all four of the MERCOSUR parties. See Recent Developments,
supra note 34, at 27 (explaining that Brazil and Uruguay each continued to require prior govern-
mental approval of the importation of a number of products, including flour, wheat, petrochem-
icals, sugar, alcohol, and honey; Argentina continued to prohibit the importation of wine in bulk;
and Paraguay persisted in banning the importation of a "wide range" of items). At a meeting of
the MERCOSUR Presidents in August 1995, Uruguay complained of Brazil's erection of new
non-tariff barriers that would hinder the exportation of Uruguayan grains and textiles to Brazil.
See Summit of Mercosur Presidents Discusses Group's Initial Problems, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1351 (Aug. 9,1995).
154. See MERCOSUR Free Trade Area Jeopardized by Rifts between Argentina and Brazi4 10 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1304 (Aug. 4, 1993) [hereinafter MERCOSUR Jeopardized).
155. See Argentine Government Facilitates Dumping Cases, Tax Recovery, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 981
(June 12, 1996).
156. See Progress, supra note 148, at 663; Common Market Under MERCOSUR Delayed as Countries
Fail to Reach Agreement 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 989 (June 16, 1993).
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arose over the completion of lists of items to be exempted from MERCOSUR's common
external tariff.'5 7 Still, the most serious threat to MERCOSUR's common external tariff
occurred in March 1995, when Brazil unilaterally raised the tariffs on 109 exempted goods
to seventy percent, far, far in excess of the tacit understanding between the parties that tar-
iffs on exempted goods would not exceed thirty-five percent.' 5 8 Subsequently, Brazil
reduced the tariffs on 90 of the 109 exempted items.15 9
As trade between the MERCOSUR partners grew in the mid-1990s, tensions rose con-
cerning the lack of intellectual property protection within the group, particularly with
respect to the rights of Brazilian companies seeking to expand sales in Argentina, Paraguay,
and Uruguay.' 60 Nevertheless, as late as 1995 none of the countries possessed any signifi-
cant legislation for expanding the protection of intellectual property rights.' 6 1
Presumably, some private businesses within MERCOSUR possessed legitimate trade dis-
putes arising out of the actions of one or more of the member states. Be that as it may, as of
September 1996, there was no indication in the public media that any private individual or
business had presented a claim to any National Section of the CMG or Trade Commission
under Artides 25 and 26 of the Brasilia Protocol. The MERCOSUR Secretariat and commen-
tators within MERCOSUR confirmed that no such cases existed as of September 1996.162
B. THE LACK OF USE OF THE FORMAL MERCOSUR PROCEssEs.
The MERCOSUR parties successfully resolved many of the trade-related disputes that
arose among them from November 1991 to September 1996. The November 1992
Argentine "statistical tax" controversy was resolved after Argentina first agreed to reduce
the tax on imports from Paraguay and later completely abolished the tax as to all MERCO-
SUR parties. 163 The December 1993 Brazilian beef and pork feud ended after Argentina
agreed in August 1994 to eliminate its ban on these imports.164 Similarly, the parties
157. Pursuant to an August 1994 agreement, Argentina and Brazil were to be permitted to exempt up
to 300 products from the common external tariff, while Paraguay was to be allowed to exempt
399 items. See Presidents of MERCOSUR Nations Ratify Common External Tariffs 11 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1268 (Aug. 17, 1994). By November 1994, thi parties encountered some difficulty in
developing complete exemption lists and had to postpone the deadline for doing so. See
Complications, Delays Beset MERCOSUR Pact Implementation, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1669-70
(Nov. 2, 1994).
158. See Bill Hinchberger, Mercosur's Pain and Presence, INT'L Bus., June 1995, at 46, 48; Recent
Developments supra note 34, at 27. This action by Brazil technically did not violate the Treaty of
Asuncion because the thirty-five percent ceiling on exempted items was based on a mutual
understanding and not a formal treaty limitation. Id.
159. Id. at 27,.
160. See Trademark Piracy Tops MERCOSUR Nations'Agenda, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 305 (Feb. 15,
1995).
161. See id.; Mercosur Nations Examine Trademark Piracy, J. PROPRIETARY RIGHTS, Apr. 1995, at 37.
162. Telephone Interview with Manuel Olarreaga, Coordinator, MERCOSUR Secretariat (Oct. 8,
1996); Telephone Interview with Professor Adriana Dreyzin de Klor, Faculty of Law and Social
Sciences, Universidad Nacional de C6rdoba (Oct. 3, 1996).
163. See Progress, supra note 148, at 663; Recent Developments, supra note 34, at 29 n.4.
164. SeeAfter NAFTA, AFTA?, EcONOMIsT, Aug. 13,1994 at 15,16.
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resolved their disputes over the common external tariff. This is true with regard to the
"sensitive" items dispute, 165 the conflict over exemptions from the common external
tariff,166 and the March 1995 effort by Brazil to unilaterally raise external tariffs to seventy
percent 167 Officials from Argentina and Brazil also negotiated a solution to the July 1993
antidumping dispute. 168 Finally, the leaders of the four MERCOSUR countries were able
to formulate a solution to many of their intellectual property concerns. 169
Curiously, although many major disputes between the MERCOSUR parties were set-
tled, it is not necessarily the case that these resolutions were products of the group's formal
dispute settlement structures. To a great degree it is unclear whether the disputing parties
formally invoked the MERCOSUR's dispute settlement mechanisms to reach solutions or
whether they simply operated outside that structure. MERCOSUR's initial dispute resolu-
tion system, in effect from November 1991 to April 1993, did not require a party invoking
that system to provide formal notice of such invocation. 170 Thus, during the trading bloc's
initial eighteen months, disputes arose and were resolved, but not necessarily within the
MERCOSUR structure. 17 1
The Brasilia Protocol, which took effect in April 1993, specifically requires that, when
a controversy concerning interpretation, application, or breach of the Treaty of Asuncion
arises and the parties initiate direct negotiations to resolve it, the involved parties are to
inform the CMG, through the Secretariat, of the issues under negotiation and the out-
come. 172 As of the time notice became required, it appears that only two disputes, those
concerning Brazil's automobile import quotas and its "financial guarantee" requirements
on Uruguayan textiles and clothing, were formally placed into the MERCOSUR dispute
settlement system. 173 The automobile quotas dispute ended following negotiations in
165. See Presidents of MERCOSUR Nations Ratify Common External Tariffs, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
at 1268 (Aug. 17, 1994).
166. See Brazi4 Argentina Agree on Details; MERCOSUR Customs to Take Effect Jan. 1, 11 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1952-53 (Dec. 21, 1994).
167. See Recent Developments, supra note 34, at 27-28.
168. See MERCOSUR Jeopardized, supra note 154, at 1304.
169. In August 1995, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay signed the Protocol on Harmonization
of Rules on Intellectual Property in Mercosur in Relation to Trademarks, Geographical
Indications and Denominations of Origin, under which illegally registered trademarks would be
voided. See Governments Sign Agreement to Harmonize Trademark Laws in South American
Countries, J. PROPRIETARY RIGHTS, Feb. 1996, at 31, 31-32. Moreover, in October 1996 the MER-
COSUR parties agreed to pursue coordination of their respective intellectual property policies.
See MERCOSUR Nations Ready to Move to Intellectual Property, Fiscal Issues, 13 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1587 (Oct. 16, 1996).
170. See Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 16, Annex III(1).
171. See Michael Reid, MERCOSUR Survey: The Road to a Single Market, EcONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1996, at
24 (explaining that MERCOSUR's dispute settlement mechanisms remained untested).
172. See Brasilia Protocol, supra note 88, art. 3(1).
173. See Uruguay Economy, supra note 152; Pastori, supra note 35, at 3 (stating that the Brasilia
Protocol "was never used during the transition period," which ended on December 31, 1994).
174. See Brazil Abandons Car Quotas for Fellow MERCOSUR Members, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1224-25 (July 19, 1995). It appears that this dispute may have been settled within the context of
MERCOSUR because an official from Argentina stated: "It is very encouraging that we settled the
issue a whole week before the [30-day] deadline, because it confirms the stability of the MERCO-
SUR agreements." Id.
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which Brazil decided not to limit automobiles imported from its MERCOSUR partners.174
The May 1996 "financial guarantee" controversy between Brazil and Uruguay apparently
was being handled within the MERCOSUR dispute resolution system and appeared to be
ongoing as of September 1996.175 One conflict, that arising out of the March 1995
attempt by Brazil to unilaterally raise external tariffs to seventy percent, clearly was
resolved outside of MERCOSUR's dispute settlement structure. 176
A second problem, even considering the present provision for notice to the MERCO-
SUR Secretariat, is that the Secretariat does not make the relevant information, such as the
nature of a controversy, the date negotiations were requested, the identities of the com-
plaining party and party complained against, or the date and substance of any resolution,
available to the public. Assuming compilations or lists of such information exist, they are
limited to internal use only.1 77
South American commentators confirm that, as of September 1996, MERCOSUR's
formal dispute resolution structures rarely had been invoked. 178 This is despite the fact
that in the five years from 1991 to 1996, trade between the MERCOSUR nations "bal-
looned from $4 billion a year to $14.4 billion,"'179 providing ample opportunities for con-
flict. What explains the parties' non-use of the dispute resolution systems they carefully
negotiated and officially assented to in the Treaty of Asuncion, Brasilia Protocol, and Ouro
Preto Protocol? The next section examines several possible answers.
C. THE ROLE OF CULTURE AND PRESIDENCIALUsMO IN MERCOSUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Two emerging explanations for the non-use of MERCOSUR's dispute settlement sys-
tems relate to Latin American culture and the near total political dominance of the four
MERCOSUR presidents. Professor Sola explains that the absence of any claims by private
persons or firms under Articles 25 and 26 of the Brasilia Protocol is attributable to "legal
culture," not to any perceived lack of merit in the structure itself.' 80 "They [private par-
175. See Uruguay Economy, supra note 152.
176. One author suggests two reasons why the dispute never was subject to the group's dispute settle-
ment system. First, there was little Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay could do in view of Brazil's
economic dominance. See Recent Developments, supra note 134, at 27-28 ("Brazil's ability to raise
its tariffs up to 70 percent on over 100 products with little overt complaints from its MERCO-
SUR partners serves to underscore who the real powerhouse is within the four country group-
ing."). Second, Brazil's MERCOSUR partners stood to profit from the high Brazilian tariffs on
imports from third-parties. Id. at 28.
177. Telephone Interview with Manuel Olarreaga, Coordinator, MERCOSUR Secretariat (Oct. 8,
1996). The Ouro Preto Protocol stipulates that rulings of the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunals are
to be published in the trading group's official journal, see Ouro Preto Protocol, supra note 23, art.
39; however, since no controversies have reached the arbitration stage under MERCOSUR, there
have been no arbitration rulings to report. Even had some rulings existed, they may not have
been publicized since, at late as February 1996, no official MERCOSUR Bulletin existed. See JUAN
V. SoLA, LA JERARQUIA DE LAS LEYES Y REGLAMENTOS NACIONALES CON LAS NORMAS DEL MERCOSUR 5
(1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
178. Telephone Interview with Professor Adriana Dreyzin de KIor, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences,
Universidad Nacional de C6rdoba (Oct. 3, 1996); SoLA, supra note 177, at 11.
179. Michael S. Serrill, Keep It in the Neighborhood Forget NAFTA-South America is Busy Building its
Own Powerful Trading Bloc, Called Mercosur, TIME INT'L, Aug. 26, 1996, at 26.
180. See SOLA, supra note 177, at 11.
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ties] prefer in riany cases to lobby their own national authorities to negotiate an appropri-
ate solution with the authorities of the other government. In other legal cultures resort to
the national courts and binding arbitration is preferred. As Mercosur's legal community
becomes consolidated in the future, it is probable that this [adversarial approach] will be
the path selected." 181 Thus, the non-use of MERCOSUR's formal dispute settlement sys-
tems in part may be attributable to a cultural predisposition toward informal, non-public,
non-adversarial methods of conflict resolution. 182
The second explanation focuses on the broad authority and practice of the four MER-
COSUR presidents to get directly involved in trade disputes that arise within the bloc.
"Even Mercosur's smallest disputes have tended to go up for settlement by national presi-
dents." 183 Although neither the Treaty of Asuncion nor Ouro Preto Protocol formally des-
ignates the presidents as members of any MERCOSUR institution, the executives in fact
are the central actors in MERCOSUR. According to Professor Manzetti: "MERCOSUR
has been marked by a top-down development strategy heavily dependent upon presiden-
tial initiatives, the initiative still remains firmly in the hands of the presidents and of their
respective ministries of foreign affairs."184
To assure that the MERCOSUR presidents would be personally involved in resolving
major controversies without extensive delay, the Treaty of Asuncion stipulated that the pres-
idents would convene at least once a year.185 The presidents "strictly fulfilled" this obliga-
tion during the period 1991 to 1994.186 After 1994, the Ouro Preto Protocol doubled the
formal involvement of the presidents by explicitly requiring them to meet "at least once
every six months " 187 As of September 1996, the MERCOSUR presidents had done so.188
To a great degree the active and direct involvement of the presidents of Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay makes sense and is explainable as part of a larger political
181. Id. ("Prefieren en muchos casos insistir en el lobby a las autoridades nacionales para que stas a
su vez negocien la soluci6n del diferendo con los derrs Estados parte. En otras culturas juridi-
cas se preferiria el acceso a los tribunales nacionales y al arbitraje obligatorio. Es probable que
en el futuro con la consolidaci6n de la comunidad de derecho del Mercosur este sea el camino
utilizado.").
182. An additional reason for the absence of claims by private parties under Artides 25 and 26 may be
that such parties perceive there to be risks in complaining to officials administering MERCOSUR
that would not be present if, instead, private parties could complain to judicial tribunals. See
Roberto Bloch, Aportes para la Resoluci6n de Conflictos en d Mercosur, EL DERECHO, May 31, 1995,
at 23,25 ('.. los Estados dominan a los 6rganos actuales del Mercosur y son los que en definitiva
efectuardn el control de admisibilidad de los reclamos presentados por los particulares, aceptin-
dolos o rechazAndolos; ademls, someteria a un extremadamente azaroso resultado la tutela debi-
da a los intereses de los particulares, tal como funciona el sistema.").
183. Michael Reid, A Survey of Mercosur: A Lopsided Union, ECONOMIST, Oct. 12, 1996, available in
1996 WL 11247181 [hereinafter Lopsided Union].
184. Manzetti, supra note 10, at 117-18. See also Lopsided Union, supra note 183, at 9 (explaining that,
in practice, decision-making in MERCOSUR typically has rested with the presidents).
185. Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 24, art. 11.
186. See Pastori, supra note 35, at 1-2.
187. Ouro Preto Protocol, supra note 23, art. 6.
188. Telephone Interview with Professor Adriana Dreyzin de Klor, Universidad Nacional de C6rdoba,
C6rdoba, Argentina (Oct. 3, 1996).
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pattern of presidencialismo. Argentine political scientist Guillermo O'Donnell argues that
the young democracies one finds in Argentina and Brazil constitute "delegative democra-
cies:' as distinct from "representative democracies ' 189 Representative democracies, such
as those of "highly developed capitalist countries:' are characterized by the presence of
strong formal institutions-e.g., a congress, judiciary, political parties, fair elections, and a
strong executive which are, in fact, "important decisional points in the flow of influence,
power, and policy." 190 In such systems, the president's accountability runs both vertically,
to voters, and horizontally, "across a network of relatively autonomous powers (i.e., other
institutions) that can call into question, and eventually punish" attempts by the president
to discharge his responsibilities in improper ways. 191
In stark contrast, "[d]elegative democracies rest on the premise that whoever wins
election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained
only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of
office. The president is taken to be the embodiment of the nation and the main custodian
and definer of its interests.'' 192 Moreover, "[iun this view, other institutions-courts and
legislatures, for instance-are nuisances that come attached to the domestic and interna-
tional advantages of being a democratically elected president."193 In short, presidents in
delegative systems are subject to vertical accountability, to voters, but largely are free from
the burdens of horizontal accountability.194 By implication, therefore, it is in the political
self-interest of the president in a delegative democracy to oppose the rise of formal organi-
zations that may challenge or deplete his own authority. 195
Pragmatism, as well as cultural preference and political expectations, may explain the
phenomenon of presidencialismo within MERCOSUR. In MERCOSUR the direct and
authoritative involvement of each country's leader simultaneously exists by virtue of and
perpetuates the lack of strong supranational institutions. "By giving leaders of the mem-
ber countries direct responsibility for MERCOSUR's development during its initial stages,
rather than delegating authority to a supranational bureaucracy, it was hoped that deci-
sions could be made, and effective action taken, more quickly: 196 Thus, presidencialismo
South American-style helps to explain why the MERCOSUR parties have been able to suc-
189. See Guillermo O'Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMocR cY 55, 55-56 (1994). Interestingly,
Professor O'Donnell categorizes Uruguay as a representative democracy, not a delegative one. See
id. at 56. According to O'Donnell, Uruguay presents a case of "redemocratization" wherein the
executive, upon the return to democracy, had no choice but to work with a "strongly institution-
alized legislature" that, in turn, constrained the executive's authority. See id. at 63-64.
190. Id. at 57.
191. See id. at 61.
192. Id. at 59-60. "After the election, voters/delegators are expected to become a passive but cheering
audience of what the president does.' Id. at 60.
193. Id. at 60.
194. See id. at 61.
195. See id. at 61-62. As O'Donnell describes it, delegative democracies manifest an "anti-institutional
bias." See icL at 66.
196. Manzetti, supra note 10, at 119.
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cessfully address trade-related disputes that have arisen, not by resorting to the formal dis-
pute resolution structures of MERCOSUR, but "through new internal arrangements or the
offer of side payments" 197
D. COMPARISON TO THE EARLY DISPUTE RESOLUTION EXPERIENCE UNDER NAFTA.
There are many differences between the early dispute settlement experience under
MERCOSUR and NAFTA. Some of these are interesting but, ultimately, of only interme-
diate significance. For example, whereas the South Americans have shown little concern
for tracking controversies that formally entered MERCOSUR's dispute resolution struc-
tures and for disseminating information to the public about such controversies, the North
Americans meticulously have tracked all formal NAFTA disputes and, upon request, will
provide non-confidential material to any interested person. Under NAFTA it is possible,
on any given day, to learn exactly what cases have entered the Chapter 20, Chapter 19,
environmental, and labor systems; what the nature and current status of each case is; and
the approximate date on which rulings or reports in such cases will be issued. This clearly
is not true in the context of MERCOSUR and, in part, may be due to the expectation that,
after elections, voters in countries such as Argentina and Brazil are to become passive spec-
tators of the political process.
Three other differences in MERCOSUR and NAFTA dispute resolution practices are of
more profound significance. First, NAFTA does not rely on face-to-face presidential inter-
vention for the resolution of trade-related conflicts. Since the Agreement took effect in
January 1994, President Clinton, President Zedillo, and Prime Minister Chr~tien formally
met only once, in December 1994 at the Summit of the Americas; however, that meeting
involved thirty-one other heads of state and focused on FTAA formation, not NAFTA dis-
pute resolution. 198 High-level ministerial officials from North America have met more often
to mediate trade disputes in their capacities as members of the Free Trade Commission,
CEC, and CLC; yet, even these sessions represented only a small portion of the total time and
effort devoted to dispute resolution under NAFTA as of September 1996.199
Instead of resolving disputes at the highest political levels, the NAFTA countries have
committed dispute resolution to lower-level bureaucrats in the respective governments as
well as to the formal NAFTA institutions that, since January 1994, have "materialize[d] in
buildings, seals, rituals, and persons in roles that authorize them to 'speak for' the organi-
197. Id. at 130. One example of the use of a "side payment" to resolve a dispute occurred in connec-
tion with Argentina's concern over its large trade deficit with Brazil. To defuse this crisis, Brazil
"agreed to increase its purchases of Argentine crude oil, wheat, and flour in 1993; as a result,
Argentina's trade deficit with its large neighbor decreased by 34% during the first half of 1993 as
compared with the same period in the previous year:' Id. at 124.
198. NAFTA "Amigos" Invite Chile to Begin Accession Talks, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1914 (Dec. 14,
1994).
199. As of September 1996, only four Chapter 20 disputes had advanced to a formal meeting of the
Free Trade Commission. See Lopez, supra note 22, at 170-71. The CEC had been involved in only
one environmental dispute. See i&t at 190-91. And the CLC had consulted on only two labor
cases. See id. at 196-98. This is out of a total of forty-three disputes that were initiated under
Chapter 20, Chapter 19, and the two side agreements as of that date.
200. O'Donnell, supra note 189, at 57.
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zation."200 This substantial difference between the two trading blocs clarifies that NAFTA's
dispute settlement institutions are becoming increasingly "important decisional points in
the flow of influence, power, and policy" but that the MERCOSUR's institutions are not.20 1
A second critical difference in the early dispute resolution experience is the frequency
with which North Americans have resorted to the formal NAFTA structures. As of
September 1996, forty-three separate cases formally had entered Chapter 20, Chapter 19,
and the environmental and labor side agreements for resolution. 20 2 The first formal
NAFTA disputes were brought under the Labor Side Agreement on February 14, 1994,
roughly six weeks after NAFTA took effect.20 3 The first Chapter 20 and Chapter 19 cases
quickly followed in March 1994.204 Each of the NAFTA countries resorted to NAFTA's
formal dispute settlement systems with some frequency.205
Third, as compared to the South American experience, the early North American
experience reveals the excessive length of time it takes to reach a conclusion in many North
American trade disputes. It is not unusual for major trade controversies in NAFTA to
remain pending for two years or more, without resolution.206 Moreover, many NAFTA
disputes were filed and then permitted to languish at the initial consultation stage for
extensive periods of time, without ever being dismissed or otherwise concluded.207 This
difference in speed with which North and South trade disputes are resolved is consistent
with Professor O'Donnell's theory of delegative democracy. He writes:
Because policies are carried out by a series of relatively autonomous powers,
decision making in representative democracies tends to be slow and incremental
and sometimes prone to gridlock. But, by this same token, those policies are usu-
ally vaccinated against gross mistakes, and they have a reasonably good chance of
being implemented; moreover, responsibility for mistakes tends to be widely
shared. ... [Delegative democracy] gives the president the apparent advantage of
having practically no horizontal accountability. [Delegative democracy] has the
additional apparent advantage of allowing swift policy making, but at the expense
of a higher likelihood of gross mistakes, of hazardous implementation, and of
concentrating responsibility for the outcomes on the president.208
201. Id.
202. See generally Lopez, supra note 22.
203. See idat 195.
204. See id at 168 & 175-76.
205. As of September 1996, Canada or Canadian entities and individuals filed twelve cases. See gener-
ally Lopez, supra note 22. Mexico and Mexican entities brought ten of the NAFTA cases filed as of
September 1996. See id. The United States and U.S. entities filed sixteen cases. See id. The
remaining cases were initiated by two governments or citizens of two countries acting jointly
and, therefore, are not credited as being brought by any one country. Id.
206. Two examples of the deliberate pace with which NAFTA disputes can proceed are the Chapter 20
agricultural products conflict between Canada and the United States, which lasted for over 660
days, and the so-called "Flat Coated Steel" antidumping duty case brought by American steel
companies against the Mexican government, which took nearly 770 days to be resolved. See id. at
172 & 183.
207. See Id. at 168-170.
208. O'Donnell, supra note 189, at 62.
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It is particularly intriguing that such fundamental differences in dispute resolution experi-
ence under NAFTA and MERCOSUR exist because the dispute resolution systems delin-
eated in the Brasilia Protocol and the NAFTA accords both were heavily influenced by the
dispute resolution mechanisms of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement.209
Not all comparisons between NAFTA and MERCOSUR dispute resolution reveal differ-
ences. There exists at least one major similarity. In both systems, governmental participants
recognize that although the resolution of specific trade disputes is essential, the overall rela-
tionship between the trading partners and fundamental political interests are at stake. In
NAFTA, the willingness of the parties to forestall dispute resolution for the sake of political
necessity repeatedly has manifested itself.2 10 If a complaining country's escalation of a con-
troversy to higher levels of dispute settlement might threaten the political fortunes of an offi-
cial of the country complained against, the complaining country often has refrained from
suchescalation, hoping, of course, to gain some political good will in the process.2 11
The same principle applies in MERCOSUR; however, the political stakes in that con-
text are higher. The struggle in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay is to preserve and
advance the democratic gains of recent years. Economic and political integration through
MERCOSUR is seen as a means of accomplishing those goals as well as "a guarantee
against coups d' tat' 212 In its short life, MERCOSUR already "proved its worth as an
international escrow fund for democracy and political stability. Paraguay was the test case.
In April [ 1996], the local military began to resist the authority of Paraguay's first democra-
tically elected president, Juan Carlos Wasmosy. Paraguay's MERCOSUR partners warned
the general that the old ways were over and a coup would damage Paraguay's investment
prospects. The coup stopped' 213 Thus, as is true in NAFTA, the resolution of trade dis-
putes in MERCOSUR will give way as political necessity may dictate.
V. Implications for the Formation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas.
The early dispute resolution experience under MERCOSUR and comparisons that can
be drawn from the early dispute settlement experience under NAFTA show that it is essen-
tial to approach formation of an FTAA based upon principles of gradualism and reason-
able flexibility. Gradualism implies an evolution from informal methods of dispute settle-
ment to more formal, institution-based mechanisms. Reasonable flexibility means two
209. See Pastori, supra note 35, at 2; GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTr, WESTERN HEMISPHERE
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 7 (1994).
210. See Lopez, supra note 22, at 206-07.
211. See id.
212. Manzetti, supra note 10, at 110. See also Felix Pefia, Strategies for Macroeconomic Coordination:
Reflections on the Case of MERCOSUR, in THE CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATION: EUROPE AND THE
AMERICAS 183, 195 (Peter H. Smith ed., 1993) ("The consolidation of democracy represents a
major goal of MERCOSUR.").
213. Ruth Wedgwood, Double-Jointed Diplomacy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 1, 1996, at 20. See
also Peter Hakim, Good News from Paraguay, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 30, 1996, at 19
(attributing the military's failed attempt to return Paraguay to authoritarianism, in substantial
part, to the threat that Paraguay would be ejected from MERCOSUR).
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things: (1) that the FTAA parties ought to establish time limits for making the transition
from less to more formal processes but that they should not be surprised or discouraged if
those deadlines go unmet, within reason, and (2) that deviations from the formal dispute
settlement structures, in favor of informal bilateral approaches, may not be uncommon,
especially early into the integration process.
In FTAA negotiations, the MERCOSUR parties and other South Americans can be
expected to favor a form of dispute resolution that, at least initially, emphasizes high-level
consultation. This is consistent with their culture, political expectations, and political needs,
as evidenced by early dispute resolution under MERCOSUR. Of course, this approach may
be consistent with the political interests of North Americans. To the extent gradualism in
hemispheric economic integration advances the consolidation of the fledgling South
American democracies, it serves the long-term interests of the United States, Canada, and
Mexico. Furthermore, there is danger in pushing too far, too soon. If North American gov-
ernments insist that the MERCOSUR parties and other Latin American states agree to dis-
pute resolution mechanisms that, judged by the experience from 1991 to 1996, are too for-
mal or adversarial in nature, those mechanisms may be doomed to failure. It then will be left
to protectionist forces in all of the member states, but particularly in the United States, to call
for withdrawal from the FTAA because of its perceived shortcomings. 2 14
Gradualism does not mean capitulation by those seeking more formal dispute settle-
ment structures such as those contained in NAFTA. Ideally, a dispute resolution system
could be constructed for the FTAA that varies the speed of the evolution from high-level
consultations toward formal, institutional review according to the nature of the dispute.
For example, conflicts in fields that do not challenge broad governmental interests, such as
individual antidumping duty cases, ought to be placed on a relatively fast-track to binding,
binational panel review with the caveat of course that such panels would be limited to
assessing a country's compliance with its own antidumping laws. In NAFTA, Chapter 19
binational panel review has proven to be a remarkably efficient and effective method of
addressing antidumping duty disputes. 215 Mexico and Mexican businesses, which share
presidencialismo and cultural aversion to adversarialism with Argentina and Brazil,21 6
have adapted quickly to the Chapter 19 process, even in the face of adverse rulings by
Chapter 19 panels.2 17
In other fields where broader or more fundamental government interests are at risk,
such as in Chapter 20-type "interpretation, application or breach" disputes or in environ-
mental or labor controversies, the pace of evolution should be far more. deliberate, perhaps
taking many years to reach the earliest stages of supranational institutionalization, if that is
214. According to one commentator, "[p]rotectionist sentiment... is flourishing among the American
people." Marc Levinson, Kantor's Cant The Hole in Our Trade Policy, FOREIGN AFF. 2, Mar./Apr.
1996 at 2.
215. See Lopez, supra note 22, at 201.
216. See RODERIC A. CAMP, POLITICS IN MEXICO 13 (1993).
217. See Lopez, supra note 22, at 180 & 202.
218. NAFTA, supra note 7, ch. 20
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a goal.2 18 "This is the rub: effective institutions and congenial practices cannot be built in
a day. As consolidated democracies show, the emergence, strengthening, and legitimation
of these practices and institutions take time, during which a complex process of positive
learning occurs'
219
The distinction between formal and informal methods of dispute resolution has been
characterized as the difference between "legalism" and "pragmatism"' As one commentator
explains:
Legalism refers to a model of dispute settlement designed above all, to produce
compliance with treaty norms. A truly legalistic or 'rule-oriented' system involves a
formal adjudicatory decision-making process and a strict enforcement mechanism.
Pragmatism, on the other hand, refers to a more flexible model, designed primarily
to facilitate negotiations between treaty partners. In a pragmatic system, decisions
are made by consensus of the parties, and enforcement measures are intended to
encourage further negotiations rather than to coerce compliance.
220
It is argued that pragmatism can create unfairness in the sense that it allows the more pow-
erful members of a trading bloc to "coerce" relatively weaker members in a way that an
effective, legalistic dispute resolution system does not 22 1 Unfortunately, the parties to an
FTAA may not have the luxury of a choice. If the early dispute settlement experience
under MERCOSUR is any indication of future dispute resolution practices under an
FTAA, a legalistic or adversarial regime simply is not possible at the outset.
A final critical implication of the early dispute resolution experience under MERCO-
SUR for the formation of an FTAA concerns political expectations in North America. The
NAFTA experience confirms that the fruits of free trade and economic integration are
borne slowly and it is counterproductive to promise North American constituencies more
than free trade can deliver. In the early years of an FTAA, one should expect to see only
minimally effective implementation of dispute resolution results in South America.
222
Therefore, it is essential for North American political leaders to portray realistically the
advantages of an FTAA. Even though such integration is vital from an economic perspec-
tive, expectations of tangible, early economic success should be downplayed. Instead,
political leaders should stress the vital role of hemispheric integration in supporting the
219. O'Donnell, supra note 189, at 68. See also Gary Hufbauer, International Trade Organizations and
Economies in Transition: A Glimpse of the Twenty-First Century, 26 L. & POL. INT'L Bus., Summer
1995, at 1013, 1016 (stating that "open markets work as a tide that raises all boats, but over a gen-
eration, not within two or three years").
220. David S. Huntington, Settling Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 34 HARv.
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221. See id. at 426-27.
222. In large part this is will be true because "the hasty, unilateral executive decisions of [delegative
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transition of Latin American countries from authoritarianism to representative democra-
cy. It cannot be emphasized too often that "[plolitical considerations play crucial roles in
regional integration schemes. The most successful integration experiences have political
purposes that are central to the overall mission.' 223
VI. Conclusion
As the 20th century draws to a dose, a Free Trade Area of the Americas stretching
from Alaska to Argentina appears inevitable. 224 At this stage, the critical issue for the
American democracies to decide is which of the various paths to hemispheric integration
is the best path. Brazil favors a gradual approach that merges a northern bloc with a
Brazil-centered southern bloc. In contrast, the United States may believe that NAFTA
expansion or replication best serves its interests and otherwise is the most appropriate
route to an FTAA.225 The dispute resolution experience under MERCOSUR from 1991 to
1996 suggests that any effort to transplant NAFTA wholesale to all of the Western
Hemisphere, without due regard for significant differences in culture and politics, could be
a mistake that ultimately endangers the long-term success of the FTAA.
North Americans took great care in constructing the sophisticated dispute resolution
mechanisms contained in NAFTA and the Labor and Environmental Side Agreements.
Similarly, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay carefully devised intricate dispute resolu-
tion systems and expended substantial political energy in ratifying the Brasilia Protocol. Yet,
the differences in the parties' use of these dispute settlement processes could not be starker.
Mexico, Canada, and the United States have not hesitated to resort to dispute resolution under
NAFTA. In contrast, the four South American trading partners have managed to successfully
settle their internal trade controversies largely without resort to MERCOSUR's dispute resolu-
tion devices, relying instead on face-to-face presidential meetings. If MERCOSUR is any indi-
cation, the FTAA, both on paper and in practice, is unlikely to be much like NAFTA.
Although the expansion of NAFTA wholesale into Latin America may be neither pru-
dent nor possible by the year 2005, the United States nevertheless could insist upon a hemi-
spheric agreement that NAFTA-like dispute resolution structures will come into force in the
FTAA overtime. A phased-in dispute resolution system that initially relies nearly exclusively
on high-level consultations and then, after some years, makes available the use of multina-
tional institutions and formal, adversarial proceedings for the resolution of trade disputes
might prove to be an attractive alternative. This Article's call for United States negotiators to
look beyond the NAFTA experience "is not a call to retreat from our historical leadership role
in developing the global framework for trade, but to think hard about what really constitutes
the best way to be effective in pursuing our interests "' 226
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